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This work addresses the challenge of discerning non-exact or non-obvious similarities between cyber-
crimes, proposing a new approach to ﬁnding linkages and repetitions across cases in a cyber-
investigation context using near similarity calculation of distinctive digital traces. A prototype system
was developed to test the proposed approach, and the systemwas evaluated using digital traces collected
during actual cyber-investigations. The prototype system also links cases on the basis of exact similarity
between technical characteristics. This work found that the introduction of near similarity helps to
conﬁrm already existing links, and exposes additional linkages between cases. Automatic detection of
near similarities across cybercrimes gives digital investigators a better understanding of the criminal
context and the actual phenomenon, and can reveal a series of related offenses. Using case data from 207
cyber-investigations, this study evaluated the effectiveness of computing similarity between cases by
applying string similarity algorithms to email addresses. The Levenshtein algorithm was selected as the
best algorithm to segregate similar email addresses from non-similar ones. This work can be extended to
other digital traces common in cybercrimes such as URLs and domain names. In addition to ﬁnding
linkages between related cybercrime at a technical level, similarities in patterns across cases provided
insights at a behavioral level such as modus operandi (MO). This work also addresses the step that comes
after the similarity computation, which is the linkage veriﬁcation and the hypothesis formation. For
forensic purposes, it is necessary to conﬁrm that a near match with the similarity algorithm actually
corresponds to a real relation between observed characteristics, and it is important to evaluate the
likelihood that the disclosed similarity supports the hypothesis of the link between cases. This work
recommends additional information, including certain technical, contextual and behavioral character-
istics that could be collected routinely in cyber-investigations to support similarity computation and link
evaluation.
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Con artists are attracted to the Internet because of the large
victim pool, and because of the distance between them and their
victims, which reduces the risk of being identiﬁed and appre-
hended. There are an increasing number of online scams, including
romance, auction fraud and advanced fee fraud. The ability to ﬁnd
similarities between cases can enable digital investigators to detect
some repetition in crime, like in serial offenses committed by
the same person or group, and to observe crime patterns or trends
that would otherwise be invisible such as online ‘hotspots’ andr Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is arepeat victimizations. A crime repetition occurs when crimes are
committed by the same offender, target a certain type of victim,
employ a common modus operandi, or occur in a particular setting
(Cusson, 2012).
Finding similarities between cyber-investigations of online
scams can be challenging. Perpetrators frequently change their
digital identities and technical tools they use to commit offenses
(e.g., email addresses, domain names, URLs, IP address), making it
more difﬁcult to ﬁnd links between related cases. Exact matches of
such characteristics may miss important repetitions between
cybercrime at both the technical and behavioral levels. Relying on
exact matches is also not resilient to inconsistencies in the way
information is captured, including data entry errors. There is a need
for automated mechanisms to ﬁnd near similarities in digital tracesn open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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as more complex similarities in context and behavior.
The growing quantity and variety of criminal activities and
associated digital traces make it more difﬁcult for digital in-
vestigators to discern certain non-exact or non-obvious similarities
that can reveal repetitions in cybercrime.
In order to ﬁnd these patterns, and to avoid linkage blindness
(Egger, 1984), there is a need for a centralized case repository with
the ability to compute similarities based on traces, context and
behavioral information. The present work addresses this need with
an automated case linkage process and prototype implementation
to facilitate the detection and analysis of these repetitions. This
system extends to cybercrime the prior work that demonstrated
how non-digital forensic data, including near similarity (i.e. non
exact matches) of cases, can be used to detect crime repetition. This
process is shown in Fig. 1 and was implemented in the PICAR sys-
tem (Birrer, 2010; Rossy et al., 2013).
As shown in Fig.1, the process of developing such a system starts
with the acquisition of actual information concerning the crime
phenomenon being studied. The integrated information can come
from multiple sources and can be of different kinds, including
forensic data and situational information, such as spatiotemporal
data or a description of the modus operandi (MO). Extending this to
the digital realm, Section Recommendations for collecting case
information of this paper recommends additional information
that could be collected routinely in cyber-investigations. All of the
acquired information is then integrated in a structured model (“the
memory”) that supports various types of analysis, including the
detection of relationships between similar cases using near simi-
larity of shoeprints, ﬁngerprints, faces, images and other physical
traces, as well as behavioral (MO) and spatiotemporal similarities.
The use of forensic data for crime analysis purposes is known as
forensic intelligence (Ribaux and Margot, 2003). It is important to
differentiate between the investigative context, where the objec-
tive is to ﬁnd information and develop a hypothesis, versus
the evaluative context, where the objective is to evaluate theFig. 1. Systematic crime analyconﬁdence into the hypothesis by testing them against facts and, in
the end, be able to present the case in a court of law (Kind, 1994).
Applied to the crime intelligence process, the establishment of
a link between cases, or entities is a hypothesis. Through the
investigation, other information will be used to reevaluate the
conﬁdence one could have in the hypothesis. To establish this
conﬁdence, it may be necessary to verify the results of some
forensic methods.
On the basis of this analysis, decisions could be made at both
strategic and operational levels to change the crime environment
(Birrer, 2010; Rossy et al., 2013). Observing repetition in cyber-
crimes can help digital investigators to uncover previously unob-
served linkages between a series of related offenses, to study
patterns and trends in criminal phenomena, to detect speciﬁc
vulnerabilities of victims, and to recognize a virtual convergence
setting of similar crimes (e.g., increasing use of a new technology or
online platform to commit various kinds of crime) (Rossy and
Decary-Hetu, 2018). At an operational level, having a group of
cases can be more interesting to investigate, in terms of total
prejudice, information and resources, in contrary to small cyber
cases that may not be worth. In addition, ﬁnding nearly similar
cases can help digital investigators to solve a new case by directing
them to analysis methods that were effective in past cases and can
be adapted to the new case (Casey, 2013). The process aims to focus
attention and resources on themost proliﬁc offenders and themost
problematic offenses.
Structure
This paper begins with a summary of relatedwork, followed by a
comparative assessment of different approaches to computing
similarity. The important distinction between similarity and the
likelihood of a link is discussed. Results of evaluating the prototype
system using real world data from 207 cyber-investigations are
presented. Due to the different types of cases, the kind and amount
of traces captured during the investigation vary greatly. The datasetsis process (Birrer, 2010).
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distinctive and valuable for evaluating linkages and detecting rep-
etitions between cases. This work concludes with recommenda-
tions to increase the amount of relevant traces and information
captured in future cases to support case linkage. Future work will
study repetitions using larger datasets containing a greater variety
of digital traces, combining similarity calculations of technical,
contextual and behavioral characteristics.
Related research
The process for crime analysis illustrated in Fig. 1 was applied to
traditional offense, especially for burglaries, leading to the adoption
of the PICAR system to detect repetitions in crimes across different
Swiss cantons (Birrer, 2010; Ribaux and Margot, 1999). The PICAR
system was created as a collaborative platform that gathers infor-
mation frommultiple Swiss cantons and is accessible by analysts to
support case linkage and crime analysis. This system stores links
between cases using a combination of information about events,
people, vehicles, and near similarities in forensic data such as
comparison of shoeprint, ﬁngerprint, faces and DNA. This system
supports forensic intelligence processes by storing links amongst
traces (i.e. their proﬁles) but does not store all forensic case data.
Especially, the comparison between forensic information takes
place in other databases, national or regional. For example, cases
can be linked using the ﬁngermark number X from the national
AFIS database, without storing precise information about the trace
to protect privacy.
NORA (non-obvious relationship awareness) is a complemen-
tary approach in criminal intelligence. The limitation of NORA in
the context of cybercrime is the prevalence of unstable entities. The
fundamentally different challenge in this work is to ﬁnd potential
links between such unstable entities common in cybercrime
generally, and cyber fraud speciﬁcally.
In order to regroup information from different systems,
Albertetti et al (2016) suggest the use of a data warehouse. How-
ever, the proposed data warehouse only stores situational infor-
mation extracted from police reports, and does not introduce the
possibility to integrate forensic data.
Concerning internet frauds, Birrer et al (2007), made a pre-
liminary study to show how technical characteristics could be used
to link advanced-fee frauds but they only used exact matches. Park
et al (2014), analyzed frauds on Craiglist and detected that 48% of
the investigated scams were linked to 10 groups. Moreover, they
saw that some email addresses were similar (same preﬁx with
different numbers) and that multiple IP addresses came from the
same subnet.
In the digital forensic domain, Caltagirone et al (2013) suggest
the use of a diamond model to analyze system intrusions in an
effort to integrate some technical details in their context with some
situational information. This work uses commonality between
digital traces and context in related intrusions to support pivoting
analysis.
Hutchins et al (2011) also proposed a model to decompose any
attack in a succession of actions that allowed the author to
perpetrate the offense. This “kill chain” approach can be combined
with the diamond model to represent the information available at
each step, enabling combined comparison of technical character-
istics and action phases.
Systems such as the Malware Information Sharing Project
(MISP)1 and Collaborative Research into Threats (CRITS)2 have been1 https://www.misp-project.org/.
2 https://crits.github.io/.developed to ﬁnd potential linkages between attacks against
computer systems. These systems use commonalities between in-
dicators of compromise such as IP addresses and domain names,
enabling analysts to pivot on a particular atomic piece of infor-
mation to explore potential linkages. However, these systems do
not have automated mechanisms for computing near similarity at
the technical, contextual and behavioral levels.
Dietrich et al (2013) propose a methodology using visual
hashing of screenshots of malware as near similarity to cluster
malware campaigns.
Each of these models have some advantages and weakness,
depending of the type of analysis we want to perform. Some are
more focused on linking cases, sometimes without storing all the
contextual information, while others are more focused on contex-
tual and behavioral analysis of a case.
However, all of these models allow capturing entities or events,
and relations between them. In the defense and security context,
network analysis, link analysis and, by extension, social network
analysis are commonly used (Masys, 2014). As a concrete example,
Tyler et al (2003) use emails and the associated email address to
detect communities in an organization, and present the possibility
to apply their method in a criminal context. Thesemethods support
assessment and hypothesis evaluation in many contexts including
crime intelligence. As for NORA, these analysis methods work on
established networks, and research in these ﬁelds usually take into
account stable entities. As stated by Tyler et al (2003), one of the
major challenges in network analysis is to establish the network
and detect redundant entities. This challenge is particularly present
in the digital world where, as stated earlier, offenders can easily
change their identifying characteristics. Such concealment
behavior, as well as inconsistencies in how digital traces are ac-
quired and represented, can result in linkage blindness; failure to
detect links between related cases.
Prior work has used graph oriented methods to search for attack
patterns in network logs and to detect primary targets or hidden
attackers (Wang, 2010). This approach formed graphs on the basis
of exact matching technical traces, and did not include near simi-
larity of such traces.
Network analysis and link analysis methods can be applied to
the proposed system after repetitions are detected using near-
similarity approaches and after the network is established. Future
work could also compare the propose method with NORAmethods
to see the beneﬁts of taking into account unstable entities.
Computing case linkage
At a minimum, any system for ﬁnding links between cases
should be able to search for exact matches of proﬁles deﬁned by
speciﬁc characteristics of the traces. As noted above, such technical
characteristics are unstable because they can be changed easily,
so there might not be sufﬁcient similarity to link cases with a
reasonable level of accuracy. Furthermore, commonality at the
technical level does not take into account themultifaceted structure
of cybercrime cases, making them weak indicators of overall case
similarity. To establish a link and detect repetition across cases with
a reasonable level of conﬁdence, it is important to also consider
commonality between the trace and the context or behavior. This
last aspect can be achieved by the use of network analysis, link
analysis and social network analysis which are left for future work.
Near similarity computations
At the most basic level, computing similarity involves matching
cases with the most relevant or discriminant trace's characteristics,
such as IP addresses, domain names or email addresses.
Fig. 2. Test dataset creation process.
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complicated by the presence of non-numeric values of varying
formats, and partial matches can be necessary. Several measures of
similarity are suitable to compare technical characteristics found in
digital evidence. In essence, some of these characteristics are
multifaceted and their similarity can be calculated using aweighted
sum (Casey, 2013). A limitation of these purely technical similarities
is that they do not take into account seemingly small differences
that are actually very signiﬁcant for the linkage process. For
example, a one-bit difference between two IP addresses could
actually correspond to different regions. The IP addresses
73.15.110.251 and 73.16.110.251 are both assigned to Comcast Cable,
but the ﬁrst is allocated in California and the second is allocated in
Massachusetts. This type of situation emphasizes the importance of
further studying the linkage and its context to evaluate its proba-
tive value as discussed in the next section (Linkage Veriﬁcation,
Hypothesis Formation and Likelihood).
Concerning email address, similarities between the usernames
should be computed. Indeed, commonalities may suggest the ac-
tivity of a same offender or group of offenders that will slightly
change the addresses they use. This can be true, because their MO
require the same kind of addresses or just because is it easier for
them to manage the bunch of created addresses. For instance, if a
group of authors stole an identity to commit some frauds, they
might use different addresses based on this identity for different
cases (for instance johndoe@ … and jondoe@ …). Wherein other
situations, authors need to send emails that usurp the identity of a
well-known organization, like PayPal or AirBnB. In those cases, the
email address maybe created using names like “servicepaypal@…”,
“paypalinternational@…”, ”rentairbnb@…,” or “airbnbbooks@…”
for instance. Even if the assumption of a same group of offenders
could not be proven, the detection of these kinds of MOmay be very
useful to detect and classify speciﬁc kind of situation (i.e. speciﬁc
online crime phenomena).
These similarities can be computed using usual string similarity
algorithms, but a pretreatment is required to clean up the stings by
removing some features. For instance, dots, En dashes, Em dashes
or numbers should be removed to avoid them to be taken into
account during the similarity computation. Among others, Christen
(2012) suggest the use of q-gram based methods (Jaccard and
cosine similarity), edit distance (Levenshtein algorithm) or algo-
rithms that use both metrics (Jaro and Jaro-Winkler). Depending on
the type of similarity wewant to highlight, some algorithmsmay be
more interesting. In some systems, the Levenshtein algorithm is
employed to help users avoid mistakes by presenting similar email
address/domain names.3
Algorithm selection
The different algorithms can be evaluated on a test dataset to
choose the one that best suits our goals. In a second step, this work
evaluates the selected algorithm on real world data. When using
real world case data, it was not possible to have a control on the
type of traces collected, and on their quality. Consequently, this
preliminary study focuses on email addresses.
In order to automatically detect some relevant links, a classiﬁer is
required to decide if two address are similar or not. In this study, we
decided to use a threshold based classiﬁer. The threshold is chosen
to minimize the false negative rate, because in an investigation and
crime intelligence processes, we do not want to miss relevant links.
False positives can later be excluded during the investigation.3 https://github.com/mailcheck/mailcheck/wiki/String-Distance-Algorithms
(accessed 11.4.2018).The test dataset was composed of a population of non-similar
addresses, and a population of similar addresses, both created us-
ing random ﬁrst name and last name (https://www.randomlists.
com/random-names). With one ﬁrst name and one last name,
ﬁve email addresses were generated with the formats: ﬁrst-
name.lastname@ …, lastname.ﬁrstname@ …, ﬂastname@ … (ﬁrst
letter of the ﬁrst name with the last name), ﬁr.lastname@... (three
ﬁrst letter of the ﬁrst name and the last name) and ﬁrst-
namelstnm@... (ﬁrst name with the consonants of the last name).
Two email addresses generated from the same ﬁrst name and last
name were considered similar. The population of non-similar ad-
dresses was also composed of addresses were the ﬁrst name or the
last name was common between both addresses. This process is
illustrated in Fig. 2. To compute the scores, the Jaccard and cosine
similarities were implemented following the algorithms proposed
by Christen (2012). A python package was used for the other
algorithms.4
To compare the different algorithms, we used ROC curves to
evaluate their capability to separate the two email addresses pop-
ulations (Fawcett, 2006). ROC curves show the ratio between false
positive rate and true positive rate for different threshold. As we
can see in Fig. 3, the Levenshtein metric has the best ratio, meaning
that it is possible to ﬁnd a threshold where we can detect the
similar addresses (true positive rate) with few false positives. For
this reason, the Levenshtein algorithm was selected for the pur-
poses of this study.4 The code and the test dataset is available here: https://github.com/timbolle-
unil/EmailSimilarity.
Fig. 3. ROC curve computed for the different algorithms. The cosine similarity for n ¼ 2
and n ¼ 3 gave the same results as the Jaccard similarity with n ¼ 2 and n ¼ 3
respectively.
T. Bolle, E. Casey / Digital Investigation 24 (2018) S2eS9S6However, in an investigation and crime intelligence context, the
false negative rate should be minimize. Thus, a threshold was ﬁxed
to get a false negative rate lower than 1% (Fig. 4).
Basically, this means that we should be able to automatically
detect two similar addresses if the score obtained with the Lev-
enshtein algorithm is superior to 0.44. As we discuss in the next
section (Linkage Veriﬁcation, Hypothesis Formation and Likeli-
hood), once the similarity computation is done, an investigator will
have to verify if the match is not a false positive. The investigator
will then have to evaluate the hypothesis of the link between the
two cases.
To compare IP addresses, an analogy can be made with ﬁle
system and Registry location's similarity evaluation. Similarity of
ﬁle and Registry locations can be computed, taking into ac-
count that it increases from right to left. For example, consider
“\Windows\System32\File1.abc” which is more similar toFig. 4. Distribution of the scores for similar and non-similar addresses with the
threshold selection.“\Temp\Bin\File1.abc” than “\Windows\System32\File2.exe” even
though the latter has more parts in common. Registry locations
follow the same pattern. A weighted sum can be used to calculate
similarity between ﬁle paths of arbitrary length (Casey, 2013). This
is an area for future work in cases involving ﬁles and Registry
values, such as malware investigations. In regards to IP addresses,
the similarity increase from left to right. For instance, looking at the
subnet part of the address could allow to detect addresses from the
same network. From the real world case data obtained for this
study, we saw that these traces are not common in cyber frauds, or
are rarely collected by the police. The collection of such details and
their context could permit more detection of repetitions (see 6.
Recommendations for collecting case information).Linkage veriﬁcation, hypothesis formation and likelihood
When designing a system to detect links automatically based on
near similarities between digital traces, it is important to treat such
links as hypothetical. Such potential links can be useful for making
investigative decisions and developing strategies (Kind, 1994). For
forensic purposes, it is not sufﬁcient to base conclusions on a weak
link, and it is necessary to perform additional analysis to evaluate
the likelihood that: 1) a match is a true positive, and 2) the two
cases are actually related.
In the ﬁrst situation, when an automated algorithm computes a
high similarity score between two elements, this should be treated
as a hypothesis of a link.5 The digital investigators might thenwant
to tag the detected link as a true positive, conﬁrming that there is a
clear similarity between technical elements. To be effective, a sys-
tem for computing similarities must also allow digital investigators
to remove false positive from the system, effectively overriding the
automatically computed similarity score. Keeping a log of such user
interactions can thus be required to reﬁning the accuracy of the
similarity comparison algorithms.
In the second situation, when a digital investigator conﬁrms that
a computed link is a true positive, this does not necessarily mean
there is a link between two cases. For instance, even with a high
score of similarity, if obtained on common words, a digital inves-
tigator may not be able to conclude that the same group of of-
fenders is behind two cases because of a lack of conﬁrming
information. The digital investigator may conclude that there is a
similarity but that it may be explained by other hypothesis (i.e.
similar MO, copycats, etc.). This information should however
remain in the system, since it might be reevaluated based on the
integration of new cases or guide the search for new information.
With this distinction in mind, it is beneﬁcial to give digital in-
vestigators the option to input the likelihood of the linkage be-
tween two cases. Thus, when taking decision on investigative
measures, the investigator will be able to take into account the
uncertainty associated to the information of the case. The preferred
approach to representing likelihood varies between organizations.
Some organizations use a simple likelihood scale (low, medium,
high), other groups use scales with ﬁve or seven distinctions, and
some use likelihood ratios (ENFSI, 2015).
Such kind of evaluation requires context information to appre-
hend the similarity score. For instance, the IP address found in an
email header has a different meaning than an IP address linked in
the body of the email. The system should thus integrate the rele-
vant information. This could lead to recommendations for what
police should collect in future cases, such as the collection of a
complete copy of email messages (with full header details).5 Such as the list of possible hits in an AFIS system.
T. Bolle, E. Casey / Digital Investigation 24 (2018) S2eS9 S7Evaluation
To test the usefulness of those similarities, data from 207 real
world cybercrime cases, provided by the digital forensic depart-
ment of the state police in Geneva, were integrated into the data-
base and processed for link discovery. As shown in Table 1, there
weremultiple types of offenses in the data, which led to a variety of
available information in each case.
The data extracted from the cases were integrated in a MySQL
database. We choose a database model that was ﬂexible. The model
allows to create links between entities, like pseudonyms and partial
identities, email addresses, postal addresses, etc. Contextual infor-
mation can be added in the link, as well as the conﬁdence level the
investigator have in it. From this database, statistics and link charts
were computed. The charts were created with the GoJS JavaScript
library to visualize links between cases and reconstruct networks.
The similarity scores can be computed on the database elements
and new links are created if the score is higher than the threshold
and validated as true positives by the analyst. An overview of this
data management process is available in Fig. 5. Each step of this
process can support various technology, depending onwhat kind of
analysis we want.
The information in many of these cases included email ad-
dresses but did not include IP addresses or other traces that might
be useful for computing case comparison and similarity scores. For
this reason, the evaluation concentrated on email addresses.
It was possible to compute 15,400 comparisons between email
addresses. Using a threshold at 0.44, 597 address pairs lead to
positive results. For the purpose of the evaluation, a manual veri-
ﬁcation was done to check for false positives and false negatives. ItTable 1
Number of different types of case visible in the data, with the total and average amount
Type of offense Number of successful cases (Total num
Romance 6 (8)
Inheritance 1 (4)
Lottery 2 (2)
Other 5 (11)
Buying/Selling of vehicles 7 (10)
Identity theft 7 (17)
Apartment location 27 (49)
Buying/Selling of goods online 56 (83)
PaysafeCard (advance fee fraud) 16 (23)
Fig. 5. Data managrevealed that only 40 of themwere truly similar, which means that
there was some commonalities between the addresses in the pairs,
and that therewere no false negatives. The false positive rate here is
3.63%, which is higher than the false positive rate of 2.44% in
controlled test data depicted in Fig. 4. This difference might be due
to the fact that when the populations were created, not all types of
similarity were taken into account and that they did not perfectly
represent the real world situation. False positive 3.63% is reason-
able in the context of cyber fraud investigations with moderately
sized datasets, but might be too high in other contexts involving
larger datasets. The threshold can be adjusted to the speciﬁc needs
of the case and context. A threshold at 0.5 gave only 225 positive
results and only one false negative. This demonstrates that
changing the threshold may change the number of false positives
but as noted previously, the choice of the thresholdmainly depends
on how many false negatives are acceptable in an investigative
context. Future work will concentrate on reﬁning and combining
methods to detect repetitions using larger datasets.
This testing indicates that the proposed method is effective for
detecting similar characteristics between real world cases. The
second step is to evaluate the hypothesis concerning the relation
between the cases. This evaluation should include other informa-
tion collected during the investigation that may change the conﬁ-
dence the investigator has in a hypothesis.
In the following relational diagrams (Figs. 6 and 7), straight lines
represent a direct link between two elements, for instancewhen an
email addresses appears in a case. Dashed lines represent links that
were detected using the similarity algorithm. In Fig. 6, we can see
links between email addresses that were already linked with one or
more cases, as for the cases number 78 and 80. This show that thelost in Swiss Francs (CHF).
ber of cases) Average amount lost Total amount lost
1920922 101570530
370296 370296
160972 330943
80818 440091
70010 490071
20764 190347
20308 620308
10931 1080151
976 150619
ment process.
Fig. 6. Relational diagram showing the links between events and other entities, with the link computed with the similarity algorithm. The calendar icon represents a case; the letter
icon represents an email address and the person icon represents a person. The straight lines represent known links and the dashed lines represent a link detected with the similarity
computation and the numbers on the links are the associated scores.
Fig. 7. Relational diagram showing the links between events and other entities, with
the link detected with the similarity algorithm.
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established links. In some cases, as illustrated in the case 150 in
Fig. 6, we see multiple email addresses in the same cases that
present similarity. This shows that there is concretely some similar
addresses that are used in cases, and the similarity are not neces-
sarily input errors.
The near similarity found in the data allow digital investigators
to ﬁnd new links between cases that were not evident before, as
shown in Fig. 7.
In both cases, the links based on similarities are useful. In the
ﬁrst case, they conﬁrm the already established links. In the second
case, they allow the detection of new links.
In some situation, illustrated with the email addresses found in
the cases 70 and 119 in Fig. 7, similarity highlights very close ad-
dresses that vary only by a few letters. In this situation, the link
might be considered as strong (high conﬁdence in the hypothesis
that the two cases are linked) because it seems unlikely to ﬁnd two
email addresses based on a name varying by one letter by chance,
when taking into account the geographical area of interest and the
popularity of the name in it for instance.
It was also possible to highlight other kinds of similarities where
common words are used (e.g., AirBnB in Fig. 7). In those situations,
it is not possible to be highly conﬁdent in the link between the
cases, at least to infer a same offender. Nevertheless, it can lead to
detect repetitions at another level (MO, behavioral). In this case, thehypothesis would be different and the detected link should be
evaluated regarding this particular hypothesis. The results in Fig. 7
demonstrate the value of computing these near similarities for
ﬁnding previously undetected relationships, and shows the po-
tential for linking cases on the basis of behavior, not just technical
characteristics.
This approach permits digital investigators to ﬁnd new links
between cases and can provide new insights into offender behavior.Recommendations for collecting case information
The ability to detect links and patterns across cases funda-
mentally depends on the information that is collected during the
cyber-investigation. To increase the consistency and completeness
of information available for computing case similarity, police can
use formalized guidelines to collect information in cyber-crime
investigations:
 Contextual information (e.g., start date and end date, descrip-
tion by victim and witnesses).
 The crime classiﬁcation, such as online scam, malware attack,
identity theft, child abuse material, etc. and a situational clas-
siﬁcation of the criminal activity (romance scam, investment
opportunity, inheritance, etc.). Additional research is needed to
deﬁne these classiﬁcations in regards to the various situational
contexts.
 The method used to reach the victim: email, instant messaging,
social networking, auction website, chat room, online game,
mobile phone application
 Amount lost/paid
 Victim's response to scam (sent money, sent personal details, no
response)
 Other witnesses of the offense (person or organization)
 Identity-related information of the offender (e.g., names, ad-
dresses, phone numbers, country, birth date, website, or IP ad-
dresses) and a description of how the informationwas obtained.
 Details about bank account (e.g., account number, bank name
and location) and other accounts used by the offender to receive
funds.
 Type and number of prepaid card used, and any details about
how the cards were subsequently used to make purchases (for
an advanced fee fraud where prepaid card are used).
 Although it is crucial to collect account details (e.g., email ad-
dresses, forum alias), their value can be limited by lack of
context. Collecting all correspondences between the victim and
T. Bolle, E. Casey / Digital Investigation 24 (2018) S2eS9 S9the offender provide valuable context and characteristics.
Whenever feasible, full headers of email messages should be
collected.
These kinds of information are already partially collected by
some institutions but the amount and the type of data collected can
greatly vary. For instance, in Switzerland, it is possible to report a
crime to MELANI, the Reporting and Analysis Centre for Informa-
tion Assurance,6 by sending a free-form textual description of the
offense. On the other hand, the Australian Cybercrime Online
Reporting Network7 (ACORN) uses an online reporting form with
precise questions to capture more structured information about the
offense and its classiﬁcation, the victim, the suspect, the method
and the loss. Ultimately, a combination of structured and unstruc-
tured information can be useful for computing linkages and detect
repetitions.
Conclusions and future work
This paper presents a new systematic approach to computing
near similarly between distinctive digital traces to detected link-
ages and repetitions across cases in a cyber-investigation context.
The evaluation of the developed prototype indicates that the
approach of computing similarity is required to avoid linkage
blindness. Futureworkwill exploreways to increase the accuracy of
the automatic detection of relevant links in order to enhance its
effectiveness in real world cases. The evaluation of the roles of
these links to infer crime repetitions should also be done. Crime
series reconstruction were presented as example. But the system-
atic analysis also aims at detecting online ‘hotpots’, as well as vic-
tims' vulnerabilities.
The evaluation in this work concentrated on email addresses to
compute similarities between cases. Future work will extend the
approach to additional types of digital traces to evaluate their
relative value for case linkage. This will require more data and
recommendation have been made to encourage and facilitate in-
vestigators to collect those data and their context.
There is signiﬁcant potential for future work in the area of
enhancing similarity computation between cyber-investigations.
Future work can evaluate effective algorithms for computing sim-
ilarity in cyber-investigations involving ﬁle paths and Registry
values such as intrusion and malware investigations. In addition,
future work evaluate the effectiveness of combining near similarity
approaches (to establish networks) with network analysis
methods, including graph analysis, for detecting repetitions in the
context of cybercrime investigations.
The methods and technology presented in this work are sufﬁ-
ciently general to be applied in other digital forensic subdomains,
including intrusion and malware investigations where ﬁnding
similar behaviors and indicators of compromise is crucial not only
for reusing past digital forensic solutions (e.g., reverse engineering)
but also in performing link analysis between related intrusions
across multiple organizations. In this context, future work could
include comparison of results with the exact matching capabilities
within existing system such as Malware Information Sharing
Project (MISP) and Collaborative Research into Threats (CRITS).
As we said previously, the enhancement of the similarity accu-
racy could permit the complete automation of the detection of links
across cyber-investigations (still requiring veriﬁcation and hy-
pothesis testing). The combination of multiple measurement could
also enable detection of more speciﬁc types of similarity (for6 https://www.melani.admin.ch/melani/fr/home.html.
7 https://www.acorn.gov.au/.instance similarity between names versus similarity between
words in email addresses). This may also be achieved by adapting
the threshold.
The results of this work also show that ﬁnding similarities be-
tween some traces’ proﬁles can reveal repeated MO and behaviors.
Similarities between cases could also be detected at this higher
level, which is interesting to understand particular phenomenon
and guide future investigation. Future research can study how
similarities can be computed at these higher levels of abstraction.Acknowledgements
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